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INTRODUCTION 
arcotics dogs generate a good deal of controversy, confusion, 
and ire. The sniff of a dog, directed by a police officer to detect 
drugs inside a car or home, is not a Fourth Amendment search1—a 
sharp reminder that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that word 
has parted ways with common usage. On the other hand, if the dog 
alerts, indicating it detects drugs, the alert alone is sufficient to 
establish probable cause and justify a full-blown search.2 
This result seems patently unfair to many scholars.3 After all, dogs 
are often wrong, alerting where no drugs can be found.4 Thus, the 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law; 
B.S., Yale College; J.D., Yale Law School. 
1 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
2 Police may search a car immediately after a dog’s alert under the motor vehicle 
warrant exception. Id. 
3 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the 
Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735 (2007); 
Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 22 
(2006); Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog 
Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15 (1990) (criticizing dog sniff tracking as evidence at 
trial). But see James B. Johnston, Drugs, Dogs, and the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis of 
Justice Stevens’ Opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 659 (2006). 
4 Worse yet, dogs can be biased, picking up on subtle cues from their handlers. These 
problems are discussed fully in Part II. 
N
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innocent can be subjected to intrusive searches on the basis of a 
mistake even though law enforcers had no suspicion whatsoever 
before the false alert.5 
Yet these same deficiencies are much less troubling when a dog is 
used to detect evidence of more serious crimes, like murder. Our 
collective instincts about dogs in particular, and the Fourth 
Amendment in general, are unwittingly influenced by our attitudes 
about the underlying substantive criminal law. 
This short Article makes the uneasy case for the narcotics dog. 
Those in favor of U.S. drug enforcement presumably need no 
convincing, but this Article intends to address the concerns of 
skeptics who worry about unjust drug enforcement, or who believe 
that criminalization is just plain bad policy. Dogs are just the first 
generation of a new set of law enforcement tools that can help us 
divorce criminal investigation from the bias and discretion that comes 
with traditional policing. 
Part I presents the results of new survey research showing that 
Americans are much more likely to believe police dogs violate the 
right to privacy when they are used to detect drugs than when they are 
used to detect dead bodies. Parts II and III make two counterintuitive 
arguments in defense of the narcotics dog: (1) in criminal 
investigations, random error is more equitable than human error; and 
(2) we should increase the detection and enforcement of crimes that 
may be over-penalized in order to draw public attention to arbitrary 
punishment. Those opposed to the criminalization of drugs rely at 
their peril on the Fourth Amendment to fix a problem embedded in 
substance rather than the investigation process. The Article concludes 
with some thoughts about the features of an ideal narcotics dog 
program. 
I 
AMERICAN PRIVACY INSTINCTS 
I surveyed a random sample of Americans about their reactions to 
contraband-sniffing dogs through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk task 
 
5 Use of narcotics dogs on the front door of a home seems especially problematic since 
the dog can detect through-the-wall information that ordinary human senses cannot. For a 
thorough and thoughtful critique of dog sniffs at the front door, see generally Leslie A. 
Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of 
Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829 (2009) (arguing 
that canine home-sniffs should be unconstitutional). 
BAMBAUER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2013  5:38 PM 
2013] Defending the Dog 1205 
distribution website.6 Not surprisingly, the respondents believed the 
accuracy of the dog—that is, the likelihood that a positive alert would 
result in the discovery of contraband—was an important factor in 
determining whether the sniff was an invasion of privacy. 
TABLE 1. Proportion of respondents believing a dog sniff is a violation of 
privacy 
Perfect Dog 43.5% 
1% Alerts are False 47.8% 
10% Alerts are False 58.0% 
Note: N= 69. Respondents were asked whether use of police dogs violates privacy 
rights. 
Many respondents found these fictional dogs to be privacy-
invasive even though they were very reliable—much more accurate 
than real police dogs. 
However, unbeknownst to the subjects, half of the surveys 
described a scenario involving a drug-sniffing dog while the other 
half described a cadaver-sniffing dog. The respondents’ reactions 
varied greatly based on the type of crime the dogs were used to 
investigate.7 Privacy instincts are highly sensitive to the underlying 
criminal law, and drug enforcement is evidently a lower priority. 
TABLE 2. Proportion of respondents believing a dog sniff is a violation of 
privacy 
 Bodies Drugs Difference 
Perfect Dog 26.5% 60.0% +33.5** 
1% Alerts are False 32.4% 62.9% +30.5* 
10% Alerts are False 44.1% 71.4% +27.3* 
Note: Statistical significance: *p<0.05** p<0.01 
 
6 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2013). The results reported here are consistent with the results of a very 
similar survey I previously administered to law students. The goal of this research was to 
see if lay respondents had the same privacy instincts as those trained in law. For the most 
part, they do. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law, 
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 131 (2012). 
7 The reactions of college-educated respondents were even more divergent than those 
without a college degree. Among college-educated respondents, the reactions to drug-
sniffing and body-sniffing dogs differed by thirty to forty percentage points. 
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The aversion to narcotics dogs is undeserved for reasons explored 
in the next two parts of this essay. 
II 
THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE PREFERENCE FOR HUMAN ERROR 
Criminal procedure scholars are eager to find fault with the 
narcotics dog, and the most obvious criticism is the one that Justice 
Souter supplied in his Caballes dissent: dogs are often wrong.8 
But probable cause has never required conclusive, or even more-
likely-than-not proof of criminal conduct, and traditional police 
processes, based on human observations and inferences, are often 
wrong, too. Critics who point to the fallibility of dogs unconsciously 
endorse a preference for human error over dog error, even though 
traditional police work has a track record no better, and possibly 
worse, than dogs. When police use typical investigatory practices to 
build probable cause for a drug crime, their execution of a search 
warrant results in the seizure of narcotics thirty-eight to sixty-one 
percent of the time.9 This puts the lowest estimates of dog 
reliability—forty-four percent from a Chicago Tribune study10—
within the same range as police success. The fifty-eight to eighty 
percent reliability of canine alerts cited in United States v. Ludwig is 
downright impressive when compared to overall search warrant 
success.11 
Courts have resisted defining probable cause in statistical terms, 
and scholars have cautioned against a rule that would allow probable 
cause to be established on purely probabilistic evidence.12 But 
 
8 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-12 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Some of the 
assertions put forward by Justice Souter and other critics are theories without 
substantiation in dog efficacy studies. The assertions include that dogs may alert to traces 
of drugs found on U.S. currency or to other over-the-counter consumer items that share 
some chemicals in common with cocaine. KENNETH FURTON ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC 
WORKING GROUP ON DOG AND ORTHOGONAL DETECTOR GUIDELINES 11 (2010).  
9 Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 101, 104 (2002). 
10 Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Tribune Analysis: Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Traffic Stops 
Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-06 
/news/ct-met-canine-officers-20110105_1_drug-sniffing-dogs-alex-rothacker-drug-dog) 
(but note the journalists also uncovered evidence of biased handling—the rate for Hispanic 
drivers was much lower). 
11 United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011). 
12 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE 
POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 131 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) 
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traditional police work, building probable cause through a mosaic of 
evidence, is equally probabilistic. Consider an affidavit submitted in a 
warrant application that states, among other things, that the target of 
the investigation was pacing nervously and had bloodshot eyes. One 
can quantify the suspicion that these facts contribute to probable 
cause just as easily as one can quantify the error of a dog sniff: Of all 
the people who pace nervously while having bloodshot eyes, some 
percentage are engaged in criminal activity. The rest are not. All 
probable cause is probabilistic. 
The important differences between the dog nose and traditional 
police work is not error (they both have it), but how the error is 
distributed across society. When it comes to intrusive searches based 
on mistaken probable cause, random error is much more just than 
human error. Humans, after all, are susceptible to bias and self-
interest.13 Surely some police officers’ decisions to target a particular 
suspicious subject are the products of well-honed skills, but the 
decisions are opaque and discretionary nonetheless. The costs of error 
from suspicion-driven probable cause will always fall on the 
subpopulation that seems suspicious. The costs from the false alerts of 
narcotics dogs, in contrast, are refreshingly democratic. If police 
departments use drug-sniffing dogs evenly across the population in a 
way that minimizes the discretion of individual officers, the risk of 
detection and the costs of fruitless searches can be spread more 
equitably. These are real virtues, despite the less-than-perfect dog 
sniff. 
Of course, this theory ignores the possibility of handler bias. If 
narcotics dogs pick up the cues and expectations of the police officers 
working with them, as some experiments have suggested,14 then the 
dogs’ alerts are not independent from the human hunches and bias 
that ought to be avoided. This line of research may in time uncover 
unacceptable levels of handler bias that warrant the wholesale 
dismantling of canine programs. But for the purposes of this Article, 
the issue will not be discussed in depth. The factual record for handler 
cuing in the field is not well developed, and in any case, the ideas 
 
(though Kerr shows that the danger resides in innumeracy, or in police discretion and 
misdirection; he does not make a direct critique of statistical evidence). 
13 Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug 
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002). But see GREG RIDGEWAY, 
RAND CORP., CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC STOPS 40-47 (2009) (finding 
no evidence of racial profiling or biasing after controlling for situational factors). 
14 M.K., Clever Hounds, ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.economist 
.com/blogs/babbage/2011/02/animal_behaviour (describing the work of Lisa Lit). 
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explored here—promoting increased detection and decreased 
discretion—will apply just as well to other law enforcement 
technologies that do not have the eager-to-please quality of dogs. 
III 
THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE PREFERENCE FOR NONDETECTION 
A sizable group of scholars, public health researchers, and other 
individuals believe criminalizing drug use is bad policy for a variety 
of reasons—unintended consequences to health and safety, racially 
disparate enforcement, irrational motivations at inception. Some 
critics of drug criminalization instinctively may look to the Fourth 
Amendment to frustrate detection.15 If drugs are harder to detect, then 
drugs can be decriminalized de facto. This Part quickly sketches two 
significant problems that arise when privacy is used to manipulate the 
substantive criminal law. 
First, Fourth Amendment rules developed in reaction to the War on 
Drugs ratchet up the investigation standards for other, more serious 
crimes. This has consequences that courts and criminal procedure 
scholars have not fully thought through. 
When state and federal courts pronounce new individual rights 
under the Fourth Amendment, the facts before the court often involve 
drug enforcement.16 For example, the Montana Supreme Court 
interpreted its state constitution to reject federal precedent by not 
allowing law enforcement officers to record a telephone conversation 
without a warrant, even if they had the consent of one of the 
participants in the conversation.17 The case involved a scuffle in 
connection with a drug deal.18 But two years later, the court was 
forced to apply the same rule to grizzly facts in which the police had 
recorded a conversation between a young victim of incest and her 
father at the request of the victim.19 The result—suppression of the 
recording—may be the right one, but it is hard to be confident that the 
 
15 The American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) statements in opposition to drug 
criminalization have made this move by criticizing wiretapping, random testing, and other 
investigative practices. Against Drug Prohibition, ACLU (Jan. 6, 1995), http://www.aclu 
.org/drug-law-reform/against-drug-prohibition. 
16 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 
54 (Wash. 1986); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (N.Y. 1985). 
17 State v. Allen, 2010 MT 214, ¶¶ 34–35, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045. 
18 The recording between the defendant and the police informant confirmed that the 
defendant intended to attack a man who owed the defendant drugs or money. Id. ¶ 7. 
19 See State v. Stewart, 2012 MT 317, 367 Mont. 503, 291 P.3d 1187. 
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drug context hadn’t influenced the court’s initial decision to adopt the 
rule in the first place, especially in light of the survey research 
described in Part I. 
Heightened investigation standards may also have paradoxical 
results for those who disfavor drug criminalization. Ironically, police 
departments may rely more heavily on drug laws since other crimes 
can be more difficult to investigate, and since drug charges can be 
leveraged in plea bargain negotiations for individuals that the police 
department suspects have committed a more serious offense.20 The 
result is a vicious cycle. Courts, unsympathetic to drug enforcement, 
increase criminal procedure protections to make investigations more 
difficult. In response, law enforcement increasingly relies on drug 
indictments since other crimes are more difficult to detect. This leads 
courts to again increase the criminal procedure protections, and the 
cycle repeats. 
The second problem with under-detection of drugs is its effect on 
political behavior. If criminal penalties lack proportionality to the 
gravity of the crime, we should increase enforcement so that public 
outrage is brought to bear on the political system. Substantial revision 
of criminal laws is unlikely to take place without the force of public 
outcry. Heavy enforcement ensures that the penalties of drug laws are 
obvious, and are borne by otherwise law-abiding people. The upper-
middle-class, recreational drug user will need to face a realistic 
chance of prosecution before advocates of drug legalization have a 
prayer of overcoming political inertia. 
The private enforcement of copyright laws is a useful case study. 
In 2004 and 2005, the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) filed lawsuits against tens of thousands of Americans who 
appeared to be downloading music in violation of federal copyright 
law.21 But the lawsuits quickly drew public attention and criticism as 
college students and other ordinary people were pressured into 
expensive settlements. One woman, who chose instead to fight her 
lawsuit, was saddled with over $200,000 in damages for sharing 
twenty-nine songs on a peer-to-peer network.22 These cases drew 
 
20 For evidence that drug offenses are used in this way, see K. JACK RILEY ET AL., 
RAND CORP., JUST CAUSE OR JUST BECAUSE?: PROSECUTION AND PLEA-BARGAINING 
RESULTING IN PRISON SENTENCES ON LOW-LEVEL DRUG CHARGES IN CALIFORNIA AND 
ARIZONA (2005). 
21 Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/05music.html?_r=0. 
22 Id. 
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public attention and criticism to the copyright law debate in a way 
that no previous advocacy initiative had been able to do. As a result of 
the public relations disaster, the RIAA abandoned its mass lawsuit 
techniques.23 
The RIAA’s methods to detect file-sharing have some key 
similarities to the use of narcotics dogs. In both contexts, the 
enforcers cannot control which subpopulations of Americans wind up 
being detected. College kids and secretaries and other people that do 
not fit the criminal stereotype end up in the crosshairs. Their 
prosecutions raise eyebrows, and force the public to reconsider 
whether they are prepared to stomach the enforcement of their 
criminal laws. 
Conversely, using the Fourth Amendment to decrease the detection 
of drugs provides only a temporary, superficial relief from the 
substantive problems, and tends to exacerbate the disparities in 
enforcement across class and race. 
IV 
A HIGH LEGITIMACY CANINE PROGRAM 
Knowing the public’s divided sentiments about the criminalization 
of drugs, a narcotics canine unit should voluntarily assume some 
constraints on its program. When dogs are used to sniff the cars and 
other belongings of people who are not the targets of a criminal 
investigation,24 law enforcers should be cautious in the design of their 
suspicionless sniff programs. A highly legitimate dog program will be 
evenhanded, transparent, and restrained. 
An evenhanded program is one in which the enforcement 
department deploys dogs such that, at least in the beginning, it is 
equally likely the dogs will sniff any given driver. Once the program 
has built a track record, the department can alter deployment to 
roughly match the frequency of successful searches in the given 
subdistrict.25 Moreover, the enforcement should be standardized: all 
sniff searches resulting in the discovery of a given quantity of drugs 
 
23 Mike Masnick, RIAA Abandoning Mass Lawsuits in Favor of Backroom 3 Strikes 
Policy, TECHDIRT (Dec. 19, 2008, 2:50 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20081219 
/0225073172.shtml. 
24 A targeted sniff should be based, at the very least, on the “reasonable suspicion” 
Terry standard. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17–18 n.15, 27 (1968). 
25 I do not advise using existing statistics from the department because the detection of 
small amounts of controlled substances is traditionally within the discretion of law 
enforcement. 
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should result in identical processing—a citation or custodial arrest, for 
example. 
A transparent program will maintain records on the use and alerts 
of each dog. The records should report the locations of any dog sniff, 
include the result of every positive alert, and should be made publicly 
available. At the very least, they should be discoverable to anybody 
whose car was searched following an alert from a narcotics dog. 
A restrained program ensures that the use of narcotics dogs does 
not significantly increase the number of searches of innocent people. 
A narcotics dog—even a dog whose alerts are almost always 
correct—has the potential to increase the number of fruitless searches 
because they work so quickly. While the traditional style of policing 
accumulates evidence of probable cause slowly, a dog can alert 
several times a day, potentially increasing both the detection of drugs 
as well as the number of fruitless searches. A law enforcement 
department should determine in advance some maximum number for 
additional fruitless searches. Once a department has set the threshold, 
it should cap the use of narcotics dogs so that the expected number of 
fruitless searches falls below the threshold. Here, a department will 
benefit significantly from having a better-trained canine team and a 
more accurate dog. 
Working together, commitments to evenhandedness, transparency, 
and restraint can help usher in a new and more equitable form of drug 
enforcement that is less reliant on human intuition and discretion. 
With equitable enforcement, society can better understand and 
reassess the true costs of its drug laws. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the narcotics dog doesn’t deserve the bad reputation it has 
received among scholars. The dog is the first generation of police 
tools that can usher a dramatic shift away from human criminal 
investigation and the attendant biases and conflicts of interests. 
Moreover, the reaction to the narcotics dog, as compared to the 
cadaver-sniffing dog, reveals an unsettling tendency to exploit 
criminal procedure when we are not enthusiastic about the underlying 
substantive criminal law. The natural instinct to do so may be 
counterproductive because drug enforcement will persist, with uneven 
results, and without a critical mass of public outrage. 
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